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ESSAYS
THE POLITICAL PATH OF DETENTION POLICY

Aziz Z. Huq*
No one doubts that the choice of instruments for detaining individuals suspected
of terrorism presents hard choices for legislators, executive officials, and judges.'
All concerned bring to the problem not only strong and divergent moral intuitions,
but also quite distinct views about the constraints imposed by the Constitution and
international law on the government's power to lock up its own citizens and
noncitizens. Making the problem even more resilient to consensus, few participants in the debate have extensive empirical data about the downstream effects of
detention policy choices. 2 Uncertainty about specific cases is compounded by the
rapid changes in al Qaeda's modus operandi and organizational structure, changes
that will only accelerate in the wake of Osama bin Ladin's death. 3 Facing
seemingly intractable normative and empirical differences, jurists have responded
by changing the analytic focus. Rather than asking what policies are justified on
empirical and normative grounds, they instead ask which institution should take
the lead in crafting counterterrorism policy.4 Employing that institutional lens,
they transform a debate about "first order" detention policy choices into a debate
about "second order" choices of institutional design-a debate about "the legal
' 5
institutions that are used to implement first order policy goals.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to the Frank Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund
and to the editors of the American CriminalLaw Review for excellent editorial aid and suggestions. 0 2012, Aziz
Z. Huq.
1. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain
Whom?, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & PoLCY 1 (2009) (identifying and discussing the main issues).

2. To pick but one example, the question of recidivism after terrorism-related detention is empirically fraught.
See, e.g., Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Guantanamo: Who Really "Returned to the Battlefield?",NEw
AM. FouD. (July 20, 2009), available at http://countertermrism.newamerica.netpublications/policy/guantanamo_
whoreally~retumed-battlefield (providing statistics on the total number of detainees held at GuantAnamo, the
number of detainees remaining at Guantnamo as of July 1, 2009, and the number of detainees expected to engage

in terrorist activities after release). Another difficult empirical question that has received almost no attention is
whether the Guantinamo detentions have had a criminogenic effect.

3. For an overview of recent developments in a Qaeda, see FAWAZ GERGES, THE RISE AND FALL OF AL-QAEDA
(2011).
4. For examples, see the sources cited infra note 7.
5. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-OrderStructureof Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REv. 809,811
(2007).
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Shifting the frame in this fashion has the important consequence of changing the
tools available for answering hard questions of detention policy. Addressing
matters of institutional choice, courts 6 and scholars 7 can leverage a rich vein of
constitutional thinking about the separation of powers. 8 The separation of powers
provides a lens for analyzing second-order questions of detention law because it
highlights institutional characteristics of the executive and the legislature that are
often thought to be relevant to detention policy, such as expertise, speed, deliberation, and attention to rights-related externalities. There are two ensuing positions.
On the one hand, some argue that the executive should take the lead on security
policies because of its comparative institutional advantages in acting with speed
and on the basis of a broad array of information sources (both public and
classified). Others, by contrast, argue that it is both legally necessary and
normatively desirable to have policies formulated through congressional deliberation because of the risk that the executive acting alone will behave too precipitously at the expense of individual rights. Participants in the debate, that is, agree
on how to characterize the executive and Congress, but they disagree as to which
institutional characteristics are most at a premium in detention policy.
This brief Essay uses the trajectory of detention law and policy to cast doubt on
the utility of such a separation-of-powers lens. I offer here two reasons for
doubting the perspicacity of these types of "institutionalist" arguments. First, I
suggest that the intellectual heritage of the separation of powers is plural and
contested. It is not possible therefore simply to invoke constitutional structure as a
resolving device in debates on security policy. The analyst needs some indepen-

6. Cases that have turned on separation-of-powers logic include: Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 725
(2008) (arguing that habeas corpus "is designed to protect against cyclical abuses [during emergencies]" by
ensuring that "except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ,
to maintain the 'delicate balance of government"'); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Respect for laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches
gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing a U.S.
citizen's right to judicial review of the grounds for his military detention); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even more important than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.").
7. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,LIBERTY, AND THE

CouRrs 256 (2007) ("There is no reason to think that the executive would benefit from an excessive detention or
conviction rate, or that political constraints would permit the executive to implement such a preference in any
event."); Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism Law Between the Executive and Legislative Models, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
877, 877 (2009) (noting the pervasively offered "choice between promulgating anti-terrorism measures through
the executive branch [or] ...through the legislative branch"); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115
YALE L.J. 2350, 2378 (2006) (endorsing "an approach guided by the Constitution's requirement that all three

branches of government meaningfully participate in significant war making decisions"); Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianismand Executive Unilateralism:An InstitutionalProcessApproach

to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 44-45 (2004) (making a descriptive claim that federal courts
ensure "that the right institutional process [i.e., one involving Congress] supports the tradeoff between liberty and
security at issue"); Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalSafeguards in Democracies at War, 29 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD.
189, 192 (2009).
8. See sources cited supra notes 6-7.
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dent theory to decide how to interpret the separation of powers to resolve present
policy debates. That exogenous theory, in my view, tends to do the analytic labor,
with the 'separation of power' label merely supplying a conclusory label at the
close of the argument. Second, the theory that often implicitly animates judges'
and scholars' separation-of-powers claims is one of comparative institutional
competence. But tracing the recent trajectory of detention policy in Congress, the
executive, and the federal courts, I suggest that this history indicates that it has not
been comparative institutional competence, but rather brute partisan politics, that
has shaped policy's path. To determine the future trajectory of policy, it is therefore
less helpful to ask "which institution" and more helpful to ask "which party." More
specifically, it is useful to consider how calculations of electoral risk for legislators
and occupants of the White House shift with partisan affiliation and circumstances
in ways that conduce to certain policies.
Because I have written elsewhere skeptically about institutionalist arguments in
the national security law context, it is incumbent on me to explain at the threshold
how the arguments presented here are distinct from and supplement that other
work. I have argued elsewhere that it is transubstantive dynamics cutting across
doctrinal barriers, not any logic peculiar to national security or counterterrorism,
that best explain the behavior of courts responding to post-9/11 policies. 9 In a
forthcoming article, I also draw on empirical and theoretical evidence about the
political economy of national security policy-making to suggest that principles of
structural constitutionalism-abstract conceptions of the separation of powers-do not provide a reliable guide for judges of the efficacy or tailoring of
national security policies.' ° Unlike those articles, this Essay is not focused on
judicial behavior. Nor does this Essay rely on evidence from the political economy
literature. This Essay instead focuses first on the legal theory of the separation of
powers, and then provides a historical case study to show how that theory's
predictions do not find support in the observed outcomes of detention policy. These
are arguments, so far as I can tell, that have not been aired elsewhere in the
literature.
I.
Scholars and judges alike presume that the intellectual heritage of the separation
of powers supplies a foundation on which to judge the merits of today's detention
policies." Rather than asking whether a policy is wise, they imply, we should ask

9. See Aziz Z. Huq, AgainstNational Security Exceptionalism, 2009 Sup'. CT. REv. 225 (2009) (arguing that the
distribution of remedies in national security cases post-9/l 1 reflects the distribution of remedies in other areas of
constitutional law).
10. See Aziz Z. Huq, StructuralConstitutionalismas Counterterrorism,100 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012)
(developing both political economy and political psychology reasons for doubting the value of structural
constitutional heuristics for judges).
11. See sources cited supranotes 6-7.
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whether it has been formulated by the right institution.1 2 On the one hand are those
who favor security and tend to believe that the executive should take the lead. On
the other we find those with a more libertarian bent, who tend to believe that
Congress should play a larger role. On both sides, there is a tendency to invoke the
Constitution's separation of powers as if that principle could end the debate.13
Rather than canvassing the rather large field, I highlight here just one especially
important example of this type of institutionalist logic. Justice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court in Boumediene v. Bush explicitly and repeatedly invoked a separationof-powers logic for its holding that the review of Guantdnamo detention decisions
be routed through the federal district courts." 4 To support this conclusion, Justice
Kennedy argued that the Suspension Clause-or rather, the jurisdiction guaranteed
against displacement by that Clause-"is designed to protect against cyclical
abuses [during emergencies]" by ensuring that "except during periods of formal
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the
'delicate balance of government."' "1 5 Hence, "the protection of individual [liberties]" was to be achieved by vindicating the "separation-of-powers scheme."' 16 The
Court's logic here is echoed by many commentators, who follow Justice Kennedy's assumption that the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers directs
a resolution of the currently divisive problematics of detention policy. 17
A threshold problem with this leap from immanent constitutional logic to policy
outcomes is that the separation of powers is not a simple concept. On its own,
talismanic invocation of the separation of powers does little or no meaningful work
because that tradition is diverse and fragmented. It is not constitutional tradition,
but pragmatic and consequentialist notions of institutional competence that do the
work in Justice Kennedy's argument and its ilk. The "separation of powers" is thus
a legal label applied to the end result of an instrumental analysis.
Even at the time of the Founding, the phrase "separation of powers" had already
accumulated "many meanings."' 18 At a minimum, the English experience of
12. See, e.g., Barak-Erez, supra note 7, at 878-79 (evaluating the "significance of the choice between
promulgating anti-terrorism measures through the executive as opposed to doing so through the legislative
branch").
13. For example, Dean Harold Koh speaks for many when he says, "In a war on terror, all three branches of
government must continue to play their constitutionally assigned roles." Koh, supra note 7, at 2379. That is, a
return to the legally correct distribution of powers will necessarily yield desirable policy outcomes.
14. 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008).
15. Id. at 725 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)); cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401
(1963) ("It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a central role in national crises, wherein the
claims of order and of liberty clash most acutely ....
16. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743.
17. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separationof Powers,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2109, 2115 (2009) ("[D]oes the separation of powers have a meaningful contribution to
make to our understanding of how the Constitution limits the power of the political branches to deny access to the
courts?... I suggest that the answer is yes.").
18. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 8 (1997) ("[B]y the last quarter of

the eighteenth century, no single doctrine using the label 'separation of powers' had emerged that could command
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"mixed" government and the sharper separation of governmental functions limned
and endorsed by the French political thinker, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de
La Bride et de Montesquieu, supplied two mutually inconsistent "paradigms" for
thinking about the concept. 9 Historians have identified five subsequent and
distinct streams in early American thinking about the separation of powers. 2" The
Framers did not owe sole allegiance to any one single strand.2' Those who met at
Philadelphia in 1787 did not converge on a sole design goal that would have
enabled them to select amongst separation of power conceptions. They divided, for
example, on whether a "modem European war-making state" provided a plausible
model for the new Republic.2 2 And with the exception of the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitution-which was not even followed as a template-the Framers had few
examples of how to implement the separation of powers in the form of a legal
text. 23 As a result, the Constitution's wording and enacting context can oxygenate
starkly divergent views about the division of effectual power between Congress
and the executive. Circumstantial evidence from the Founding era-such as the
Federalist Papers and the Pacificus-Helvidius debate of 17932 4-perhaps unsurprisingly supplies further ample ammunition for both sides.
Moreover, there is continuing disagreement about the core purpose of the
Constitution's separation of powers. In 1996, for example, Justice Kennedy could
enumerate in one (quite long) breath a litany of diverse, divergent goals for the
separation of powers: "[dieterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule," a government

general assent."); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 151 (1969); see also

Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1764-65 (1996) (discussing the influence
of Locke and Montesquieu at the time of the Founding).
19. See HAROLD H. BRuFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
8-10 (2006) (canvassing early intellectual influences); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITCS
AND IDEAS INTHE MAKING OF THE CONSITUTION 245-46 (1996).

20. See WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127-28 (1965) (observing that the
separation of powers has been justified as a path to greater government efficiency, laws made in the public
interest, the impartial administration of the law, accountability, and balance.)
21. See RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 250 ("In reconstituting the executive, Americans paid homage to
Montesquieu's principle of separation without allowing his (or Locke's) defense of prerogative to outweigh the
lessons of their own history."). Some go further and suggest that "[tihe doctrine of the separation of powers had
clearly been abandoned in the framing of the Constitution." FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 258 (1985); accord CASPER, supra note 18, at 22 ("No consensus

existed as the precise institutional arrangements that would satisfy the requirements of the doctrine.").
22. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY. A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 32 (2010); see
also CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY INCONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

169 (1923) ('The dogma of separation of powers and that of checks and balances. .. were not the determining
influences [on the design of the presidency].").
23. Cf MASS. CONST. art. XXX (1780) ("In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the
legislative and judicial powers, or either of them. . . to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.");
see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing that provision).
24. President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 furnished the occasion for this pseudononymous
debate between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE
PACIFICUS-HELVIDuS DEBATES OF 1793-1794 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
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"that is both effective and accountable," and "responsive and deliberative lawmaking." 25 Not all of these goals can be achieved simultaneously. Most obviously,
"effective" government, especially in crisis moments, may not be "deliberative."
And accountable government may act in "arbitrary" ways depending on the nature
of public preferences to which government is accountable. 26 Achieving Justice
Kennedy's different goals would further entail empowering different institutions in
inconsistent ways. Accountability, for example, might be best achieved through
Congress, since voters have more bites at the electoral apple. But effectiveness
might be best achieved by shifting authority from Congress to the executive, which
may have less accountability, especially in a President's second term.2 7 As a result,
a multipurpose separation of powers does not provide an operational compass to
orient policymakers in a single, steady direction today-at least not standing on its
own.
Compounding confusion, judges and commentators also part company on the
methodology conformable to separation-of-powers problems.28 Some take a
formalist approach, identifying three distinct forms of government authority and
allocating them to three textually distinct branches. 2 9 Formalists typically favor a
clear separation between the branches in the name of "vigor and accountability."3
On another side are functionalists, who find fewer clean resolutions in the
constitutional text and instead ask whether a challenged arrangement destabilizes
some pragmatic concept of "balance" between the branches. 3 1 This methodological divide multiplies possible permutations of separation of powers. The latter can
now be invoked in favor of different branches, using different interpretative
methodologies, in the name of inconsistent foundational principles.

25. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996).
26. Consider, for example, the debate as to whether democracy promotes economic growth better than
dictatorship. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MULLER, PUBLIC CHOICE M, at 423 (2003) ("Although some studies have
established a significant positive link between measures of political freedom and growth ... others have found
that authoritarian regimes have better growth records .... ").
27. Further, to the extent committee assignments provide the public with a way of discerning the particular
areas of responsibility of their legislators, in contrast to the bundled tasks of the presidency, voters may be better

able to express views on policy in congressional elections.
28. Cf Peter L. Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1986) (identifying and exploring these divisions in methodology).
29. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998) (enforcing the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses strictly); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-37 (1976) (enforcing the Appointments Clause strictly);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (enforcing the executive's removal power strictly). For an example of

formalism in the scholarly literature, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
30. STEvEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM
WASHINGTON To BUSH 13 (2008).

31. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425,443
(1977); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 611-12 (1935). For an example of functionalism in the
scholarly literature, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separationof Powers and the
Fourth Branch,84 CoLUM. L. REV. 583,597 (1984).
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The net result of these abundant confusions is that the constitutional tradition of
the separation of powers cannot, standing alone, solve the institutional design
problem in detention policy. Naked invocations of constitutional principle are
simply no response to the hard problems in detention law because they are
necessarily under-theorized. A theorist needs more than a tradition to answer
presentist policy questions. She also needs a method of constitutional interpretation and a set of normative priors about the values that government is supposed to
pursue in the national security domain. Those values must be derived from an
unexplicated judgment about what institutional qualities matter in the security
policy domain and how resources should be allocated to avoid different sorts of
risks (for example, in the detention domain, between the risk of inaction on the one
hand and the harm from a false positive on the other).
Rather than a freestanding source of elucidation, the separation of powers
instead supplies an idiom for jurists and judges to frame arguments about
democratic accountability or institutional competence. It is, so to speak, the way
we frame our questions, not a source of our answers. Rather than constitutional
principle, what are doing the work in this literature are ideas of comparative
institutional competence-notions of which branch does a better job in deliberating on hard policy questions or acting expeditiously.
II.
Notwithstanding the plurality of separation-of-powers conceptions, it is possible
that the branches have played stable roles in the drama of detention that reflect
durable and entrenched institutional competences. It may be that the executive has
indeed acted with dispatch and deep expertise as a historical and contemporary
matter, while Congress has proceeded with deliberation and due regard for
potential executive overreach and harm to individual liberties. If so, this would
suggest that the separation of powers usefully stands in for the logic of comparative constitutional competence, which should, in any event, drive the second order
design of detention policy.
This Part pursues the question of whether the path of post-9/11 detention policy
corroborates those institutional competence arguments. I suggest that the path of
detention law does not provide evidence of an efficient executive and a deliberative, rights-respecting Congress. Supporters of both the presidency and the
legislature, to the contrary, should find ground for reconsideration of their partis
pris in the known path of recent detention policy and law. Rather than an
institutional logic, I argue, detention policy reflects the naked politics that
motivates elected officials in both branches to act in ways unfounded by institutional role expectations.
I use as an example in this Part the trajectory of the Guantdnamo detentions,
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which began in early 2002.32 Those early detentions were quickly challenged
through habeas corpus actions in the federal courts, which in turn were initially
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.3 3 In 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the
availability of statutory jurisdiction. 34 Congress, however, responded by eliminating habeas jurisdiction by statute and channeling cases into a new jurisdictional
forum in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.3
Congress reaffirmed its jurisdictional strip in 2006.36 Limitations on habeas,
however, were invalidated two years later in the Boumediene decision.3 7
What does this (rather abbreviated) history tell us about the institutional
competences of the President and Congress respectively? Consider, first, the role
of the executive. As a threshold matter, the rapid early growth in the Guantd.namo
detainee population may well have been a function of the decision by the Bush
Administration not to convene battlefield hearings.38 These have been used in
other conflicts as recently as Vietnam and the First Gulf War to screen those pulled
into the detention system. 39 Rather than homing in on true threats, the executive's
post-9/l1 approach to detention was characterized by disregard of what, from a
military perspective, were elementary sorting protocols that had been routinely
employed where the tug of military exigency was arguably greater than in the
Afghan theater. As a result, initial detentions included a variety of fighters and
those swept up accidently by either American or allied forces.4n Having failed to
sort "wheat" from "chaff," the Administration nonetheless insisted vociferously
and repeatedly that it had captured only dangerous individuals-the worst of the
worst.4 1 No explanation has ever been offered for the decision to abandon sorting
protocols under circumstances in which that decision would inevitably produce a
massive spike in erroneous detentions (and thus a spike in detention costs for the
government). And no explanation has ever been proffered for the iterative public
statements by the government to the effect that the Guantd.namo detainees were
uniformly dangerous. These failures of explanation are especially baffling since it

32. KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO'S FIRST 100 DAYS, at 68 (2009).
33. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008).
34. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,473 (2004).
35. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42 (2005),
reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 note.
36. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7,120 Stat. 2600,2635-36 (2006) (codified
in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and note).
37. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 734.
38. JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFrER 9/11, at 35-36 (2010) (describing this decision not to convene
and its consequences).

39. Id.
40. Id. at 34 (noting the finding of one study that "only 8 percent of the detainees at Guantdnamo were

characterized as al Qaeda fighters and 40 percent had no definitive connection with al Qaeda" based solely on
government data).
41. Id. at 33-35.
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was the government's own decision not to sift captures for false positives that
ensured that its own claims about dangerousness would predictably be misleading.42
Over time, the Bush Administration would release more than three-quarters of
the detainees at the Cuban base.4 3 This was, in effect, implicit acknowledgement
that its threshold claims had been false, and, as a correlative, that the decision to
forego the (legally mandated) battlefield sorting measures unwise. It was also a sub
silentio admission that at the very moment at which the government securityrelated resources were in peak demand, the executive had squandered those
resources in an effort to generate a visible detainee population that provided
tangible proof to the American public that effective action was being taken against
al Qaeda. And it had done so in a way that would, in time, predictably impugn the
moralistic soft power of U.S. counterterrorism. Thus, if the failure to engage in
battlefield screenings and the bold (and false) rhetoric of Guantdnamo in the early
days is any guide, detention policy in exclusively executive hands is driven less by
expertise and more by the need to express a political, and even partisan, point.44
If the rise of the Guantdnamo detention bespeaks political motives, so too do its
decline and its recent stabilization. Four years after founding the Cuban prison, the
Bush Administration started a slow but steady stream of releases that had the effect
of thinning its detainee population.45 Between 2006 and 2008, exactly 120
detainees were released annually from the base.4 6 One might account for this
puzzling pattern as follows: By this point, Guantdnamo had served its political
purpose. Rather than an asset illustrating the Administration's toughness, it had
become a public liability. Each remaining detainee was potentially an embarrassing court proceeding and perhaps a humiliating setback for the rhetoric of
executive competence. Because the Court's opinion in Rasul v. Bush47 deepened

42. It is tempting to see the public statements as an effort to compensate for the Administration's abject failure
to mobilize against al Qaeda in early 2001. See PETER L. BERGEN, THE LONGEST WAR: THE ENDURING CONFLICT
BETWEEN AMERICA AND AL-QAEDA 36-50 (2010) (detailing the federal government's failure to prioritize the risk
posed by al Qaeda in the months leading up to the September 2001 attacks).
43. Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 402-03 (2010) [hereinafter Huq, Habeas]
(summarizing release data over time).
44. To put the point differently, notice that the Bush Administration used military detention domestically in a
way that was remarkably sparing given the historical precedent. Unlike the World War I era, there were only two
cases of domestic enemy combatant detentions. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), rev'd sub nom. AI-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); see also Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush,
233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 E3d 695
(2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The decision not to aggressively use military detention domestically is
at least suggestive of the political delicacy of this issue.
45. Huq, Habeas,supra note 43, at 385 (presenting data showing steady stream of releases from the base even
prior to judicial involvement).
46. Id.
47. 542 U.S. 466,473 (2004).
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the potential for the exercise of such compromising jurisdiction, the government
moved to empty the base. 48 Indeed, it was only with the advent of the Obama
Administration-which did not face the same negative publicity costs from
continued erroneous detentions as did the Bush Administration-that the stream of
releases dried up.49
Contrary to prevailing wisdom, the political calculus for the Obama Administration cut in favor of less-and not more-releases notwithstanding its liberal
credential. Unlike the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration does not
pay a political price from a judicial decision showing that it erred in its threshold
detention decisions. Hence, embarrassment does not provide a strong motive for
the Obama Administration to clear the Cuban base. Moreover, erroneous releases
are more costly for the Obama Administration than they were for the Bush
Administration. The behavior of the two administrations is remarkably consistent
with these political motivations5 0 : The Bush Administration, which faced little
political criticism for being soft on security, found it politically costless to release
detainees once it had proven its toughness on terrorism-and hence did so at a
predictable pace.51 By contrast, the Obama Administration, from its inception,
took political heat for being lax on security and for the possibility of detainees
returning to the fight.5 2 Consequently, it has faced more of a downside political
risk from release decisions-and, as a result, dramatically lowered the rate of
release despite its liberal inclinations. Hence, the rate of releases from Guantdnamo dropped precipitously between the Bush and the Obama Administrations.53 More telling, John 0. Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, has candidly explained the Obama Administration's inaction on Guantdnamo by saying that "political support for [the base's]
closure waned.",54 This suggests that the Administration faces little pressure even

48. Huq, Habeas, supra note 43, at 404 (charting the timing of releases from Guantinamo in the period from
2002 to 2009); id. at 405 (arguing that the Court's intervention in the Rasul case catalyzed changes to the
aggregate population).
49. Id. at 385.
50. My claim here is not strongly causal. That is, I am not claiming to have direct evidence of the effects of
crudely political motivations.
51. Obviously, there could be strategic costs to a false release.
52. See, e.g., Former Guantanamo Detainee Killed in Afghanistan, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2011), http:II
online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424053111903648204576550391937381316.html?mod=googlenews-wsj (illustrating the risks involved in ending the Guantnamo detention system by describing the reentry of a former
detainee into al Qaeda operations).
53. Huq, Habeas, supra note 43, at 403.
54. John 0. Brennan, Ass't to the Pres. for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law
School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16,
2011), availableat http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 1/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengtheningour-security-adhering-our-values-an.
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from its core supporters on detention issues. 55 Hence, by the Obama Administration's own frank admission, it is politics-not an exercise of institutional competences-that best explains its detention policy.56 This suggests the force of politics
is not easily reducible to the mere policy preferences of the President du jour.
Rather, trends in detention policy reflect a calculus of electoral risk.
While the volume of detention and the rate of releases has veered up and down,
other elements of detention policy that receive relatively limited political attention
because of their technical nature have proved to be remarkably durable. They have,
that is, remained constant across the Bush and Obama Administrations. Consider
in this regard the legal category of "enemy combatant," which has been used to
delimit the class of persons who can be detained by the military in the course of
counterterrorism operations.5 7 That definition has remained stable across two
Administrations of different political complexions.58 This may be a result of a
relative absence of political pressure to expand (or, less likely, contract) the
definition of "enemy combatant" (a relatively technical point of law). This leaves
the subject to technocratic determination or interagency politicking. Hence, the
quality of executive-driven detention policy may change fundamentally with
variance in the strength of political scrutiny to a policy question.
So much for the executive. What of Congress? The separation-of-powers
literature suggests that Congress should have been a deliberative brake on
precipitous executive branch action that infringes on basic rights, whether for good
or for ill.5 9 Congress's role may be especially important in crafting jurisdictional
channels. A central question in public debates around detention policy is which
forum will review detention decisions. 6° It has been suggested recently that
55. Although the Obama Administration gained much support for change on security-related policy from the
legal community, my impression is that this support was often framed in terms of a return to legality, and was only
ever thinly committed to substantive changes respecting the position of particular detainees. That is, liberal
lawyers' commitment was to process rather than people, which made the scope of demanded post-election change
shallow.
56. Indeed, the Obama Administration was initially open to the idea of transfers. See, e.g., Exec. Order No.
13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4898, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009) (vesting the Secretary of Defense and other participants in the
detainee review process with determining "whether it is possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent
with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and, if so, whether and how the
Secretary of Defense may effect their transfer or release").
57. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REv.
769, 791 (2011) (citing Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2600-31).
58. See Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting the Obama era 2009 definition);
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRT") for
the Bush era 2004 definition); see also Memorandum from Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y
of the Navy (July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.millnews/Jul2004/d2OO4O707review.pdf (establishing the
CSRT and providing the 2004 definition).
59. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supranote 7, at 44-45 (observing that where the executive has acted against
legislative policy or without legislative approval, the judiciary has invalidated the action or subjected it to close
scrutiny).
60. For an account of the public debate, see Charlie Savage, Developments Rekindle Debate over Best
Approachfor Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at AI4.
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Congress plays an important role by providing a "structural" defense of federal
court jurisdiction.6" Such arguments reflect the comparative institutional claim that
Congress performs better than the executive as a protector of rights and as a
friction on excessively speedy policy-making.
In reality, congressional involvement in detainee matters has been erratic and
largely animated by narrow-gauge, short-term partisan concerns. As a threshold
matter, Congress has consistently failed to speak clearly to the hard substantive
questions of detention law, such as the scope of detention authority. The scope of
lawful detention authority respecting alleged members of terrorist organizations
62
was for a decade grounded on an opaquely worded 2001 statute. Congress did
not revisit the scope of detention authority during that decade, despite the changing
demands and contours of counterterrorism policy. 63 To the extent that recent
legislation just enacted at the time of this writing contains revisions to the statutory
scope of detention authority, legislators may have initially been motivated by a
dispute between the Departments of State and Defense over the application of the
2001 statute to counterterrorism operations in Yemen and Somalia.64 Rather than a
source of careful and cautious deliberation, then, Congress has persistently passed
65
the buck to the executive and the judiciary on the scope of detention authority.
This is consistent with political science models that predict Congress will try to
avoid hard questions of policy, preferring instead to legislate in ambiguous terms
that allow all concerned legislators to claim credit and avoid blame.66

61. See generallyTara Leigh Grove, The StructuralSafeguardsof FederalJurisdiction,124 HARV. L. REV. 869
(2011) (arguing that the veto gates of bicameralism and presentment make it very unlikely that Congress will strip
away jurisdiction, and that they hence provide "structural safeguards" to Article III jurisdiction).
62. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
63. To be sure, there have been some proposals to amend the scope of detention authority. See, e.g., Enemy
Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, H.R. 4892, 111 th Cong. §§ 4, 6(10) (2d Sess.
2010) (defining a category of "unprivileged enemy belligerent"). The Obama White House has opposed these
proposals on the ground that they would have little operational effect. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.Office
of the President, Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 1540-National Defense Authorization Act FY 2012
(May 24,2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultl/files/omb/legislative/sap/l 12/saphrl540r_- 20110524.pdf
("The Administration strongly objects to section 1034 which, in purporting to affirm the conflict, would
effectively recharacterize its scope and would risk creating confusion regarding applicable standards."). The
proposals, thus, are best seen as partisan theatrics rather than responses to policy challenges on the ground.
64. See Charlie Savage, At White House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at Al
(discussing the Obama Administration legal team's disagreement over the authority to kill Islamist militants in
Yemen and Somalia). For a discussion of the newly enacted clarification of detention authority, which in fact
changes the relevant law surprisingly little, see Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choicefor Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J.
1415, 1498-1500(2012).
65. See BENJAMIN WI=rES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 131-34

(2008) (arguing that Congress should play a more vigorous role in detention policy).
66. See DAviD EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POwERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197-98 (1999) (arguing Congress will always delegate

authority to avoid political costs).
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Congress's main intervention in detention policy has taken two forms. First, it
has enacted jurisdiction-stripping measures targeting habeas corpus litigation
related to Guant~.namo Bay.6 7 Second, it has enacted a raft of post-2008 measures
meant to reproduce the effect of jurisdiction-stripping without running afoul of the
Suspension Clause. 68 After the Boumediene Court rejected jurisdiction-stripping
in habeas cases,69 the 110th Congress curbed executive discretion to release
detainees, including those found innocent of any connection to terrorism. 70 In the
111 th Congress, legislators enacted further restrictions on detainee transfers. 7' A
consequence of these measures is that physical release is a distant prospect even
for detainees at Guantnamo who have already been cleared for such release by the
72
military.

Congress has thus assuredly not provided a structural safeguard for habeas or
other core rights. It has not done so because it is not in legislators' politicalinterest
to play this role. Just as in other domains of social order maintenance where the
safety of the many is weighed against the liberty of the few (e.g., crime-related
policy), congressional intervention has routinely listed toward the preservation or
even the expansion of detention authority. 73 Detainees and their fervent supporters
make up a trivial portion of electorate. 74 It seems likely that they are far
outnumbered by those who wish to see government err on the side of excess
detention (especially if those detained have different complexions, faiths, or
passports). This dynamic is visible in the recent restrictions on detainee transfers.

67. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006) (codified
in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and note); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat.
2680, 2741-42 (2005), reprintedin 10 U.S.C. § 801 note.
68. This demonstrates that the rich scholarly debate on jurisdiction-stripping omits an important fact: Congress
can achieve the same result as jurisdiction-stripping by altering either substantive statutory rights or the remedial
entitlements for constitutional interests. It may be the availability of these substitutes, and not any constitutionally
infused norm, that has made jurisdiction-stripping so infrequent.
69. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 734 (2008).
70. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(a), 123 Stat. 1859 (2009).
71. MICHAEL JOHN GARIAc, CONG. RES. SERV., GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER: LEGISLATIVE AcrvrrY IN THE

II1TH CONGRESS 18 (2010).
72. In addition, the D.C. Circuit has proved categorically set against any releases. See Peter Finn & Del
Quentin Wilber, Guantanamo Detainees See Legal Progress Reversed, WASH. POST (June 24, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/guantanamo-detainees-see-legal-progress-reversed/
2011/06/21/AGr7lljHstory.html.
73. Cf JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN

AMERICAAND EUROPE 43-57 (2003) (making a similar point about criminal justice).

74. Cf. CNN, CNN Poll: Big Shift on Closing of Guantanamo Bay Facility, CNN Pots. (Mar. 29, 2010,
10:18Am), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/20 l0/03/29/cnn-poll-big-shift-on-closing-of-guantanamo-bayfacility/ (reporting that less than forty percent of Americans believe the facility in Cuba should be closed). Like
many such polls, this one must be taken with a pinch (or a handful) of salt.
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Individual legislators openly express "NIMBY ' '75 fears about the possibility of
trials or confinements of former detainees in their districts.7 6
The combination of legislators' local allegiances and their national mandate has
a deleterious effect.7 7 From the legislators' perspective, a status quo that is costly
and suboptimal for the nation may nonetheless be preferable to change that may
land them in electoral peril. So long as transferring detainees to the United States is
a plausible policy option-and no other option may be feasible for those found to
be innocent but whom no other nation will take-congressional sensitivity about
the placement of detainees renders convergence on an optimal transfer policy
unlikely.
In short, neither the behavior of Congress nor that of the executive on detention
matters is well explained in terms of the standard institutional competence
predicates of the separation of powers.78 The deliberative Congress and the
omnicompetent executive are mere figures in the fecund imagination of the
constitutional scholar. They are not empirical regularities. Parochial politics
routinely overwhelms institutional considerations on both ends of Pennsylvania
Avenue. 79 The path of detention policy can thus better be explained by the ebb and
flow of political forces acting directly on elected officials. So even if separation-ofpowers theory yielded stable answers, it would be to no avail. Politics, not any
institutional logic, is the best predictor of policy change.8 °

75. "Not in my backyard." For example, legislators have expressed alarm that concededly innocent Uighur
detainees might be transferred into the United States, despite the fact that even the government does not see
them posing a risk. Peter Finn, Nominee for CounterterrorismChief Is Grilled on Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Plans, WASH. POST (July 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/nationallnational-security/nominee-forcounterterrorism-chief-is-grilled-on-guantanamo-bay-detainee-plans/201 l1/07/26/glQAluqWbILstory.html?nav=
emailpage.
76. See Daniel Nasaw, Republicans Try to Block GuantanamoDetaineesfrom Prisons in TheirDistricts,THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Feb. 17, 2009, 7:25 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/16/guantanamorepublicans-prisons (discussing bills to bar government from moving inmates in detention centers to federal
prisons).
77. Cf. WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 160-61 (2011) (noting the
potentially perverse effects of political localism in the federal criminal law context). Stuntz more generally favors
increased local control of policing for reasons that are not relevant to the analogy I draw here.
78. By contrast, were one to reconstruct the separation of powers around the presumption that Congress is
routinely craven while the executive engages in security charades, one might approximate better the observed
play of institutional forces.
79. Accord Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separationof Parties,Not Powers, 119 HARv. L. REv. 2311
(2006) (arguing that political motives, not institutional identity, drive political branch actors).
80. It is for this reason that I am skeptical of the turn to emergency politics or the analytic framework of "states
of exception" to explain the development of post-9/11 detention policy. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE
OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). That analytic framework pays too short thrift to the mundane operation
of politics in supposedly extraordinary times.
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CONCLUSION

Many scholars follow Justice Kennedy's lead in valorizing the separation of
powers as a useful lens for the analysis of second-order questions of detention law.
I have offered here two reasons for skepticism of this analytic move. First, I have
suggested that the tradition of the separation of powers is too varied to provide
analytic grist on its own. The analyst's unstated assumptions about comparative
institutional competence do the real work, standing apart from any coherent
constitutional tradition. Second, analyzing Guantdnamo detention policy, I have
argued that politics, not institutional competence, best explains the path of
detention policy. If the ordinary ebb and flow of democratic politics tugs on and
shapes detention policy, then the separation of powers provides no template for
understanding, let alone directing, the path of detention law.
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